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Abstract
Recent experimental research in corporate social responsibility suggests that principal
philanthropy offers benefits to the firm. I test this finding using archival data in a natural
experiment. In publically traded firms, I find that charitable pledges by blockholders create
agency problems that overwhelm any benefits and destroy shareholder value. This effect is
stronger when the blockholder has, beyond his economic incentives, a fiduciary duty (as a
director or fund manager) to monitor the firm and its managers. I attribute these findings to
small investors relying on the self-interest of major shareholders to monitor their shared
investment. A charitable pledge lessens the market’s expectation of the philanthropic
blockholder’s self-interest, which reduces the ability of small investors to rely on him (and his
preference for wealth-maximization) to monitor the firm.

Introduction
Corporate social responsibility is an increasingly popular topic in business research (see
Moser & Martin, 2012 and Taneja, Taneja, & Gupta, 2011 for overviews from the accounting
and management/ethics standpoints, respectively). Most of these studies focus on managers
taking charitable actions with owner resources. However, of the approximately $300 billion
given to charity in the US in 2011, corporations were responsible for only about 5%, whereas
individuals were responsible for 73% (Nichols, 2012).
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The charitable actions of individuals have received, to the best of my knowledge, no
serious examination from either academic or practitioner researchers in business. This is
unfortunate, as many of these individuals are shareholders (principals) of publically traded
corporations whose charity could affect the value of the firms they own and monitor. I attempt
to address this gap in the literature and examine the effect of individual shareholder charity on
firm value.
Examining individual philanthropy is complicated by data issues. While corporations
must disclose financial statements to the public for reasons of transparency, individuals have no
such obligation. Given this matter of data availability, I am forced to rely on a natural
experiment in which individuals publically announce their philanthropy. While it is popular for
wealthy individuals to announce and celebrate their charitable gifts, I focus on a specific
philanthropic drive, The Giving Pledge, for the purposes of this paper.
The Giving Pledge is a charitable drive instigated by Bill Gates and Warren Buffett in
2010 (Banjo & Guth, 2010). The charity drive seeks to secure pledges from super wealthy
individuals who undertake to donate or bequeath to charity at least half of their wealth. SEC
1

Giving USA’s Annual Report on Philanthropy only includes charitable donations. It is difficult to account for the
amount firms spend in other CSR activities (e.g. green investing).
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filings reveal that many of the signatories to The Giving Pledge are blockholders (own greater
than 5% of shares) of publically traded corporations.
After identifying the subset of The Giving Pledge participants who own blocks of US
corporations, I use event studies to identify investors’ reaction to the news that a blockholder has
pledged a substantial portion of their wealth to charity. Behavioral theories based in psychology
generally suggest that the preferences of a firm’s stakeholders for altruism and charity will result
in positive abnormal returns to a firm’s socially responsible actions, such as philanthropic
pledges by blockholders (see Jones, 1995 for a review of stakeholder theory). Agency theory,
however, suggests that small shareholders rely on the self-interest of blockholders to monitor
managers. If a major charitable pledge by a blockholder signals weakening self-interest (and
increasing selflessness), then smaller shareholders may fear that the philanthropic blockholder
2

has incentives misaligned with their own, and subsequently question his ability to act as an
effective monitor. If blockholder charity creates this agency problem, and enough small
shareholders lose trust in the ability of the philanthropic blockholder to monitor their investment,
firm value could suffer.
I weigh these effects, the stakeholders’ preferences for altruism versus the agency
problem of selfless blockholders. I find that the philanthropic pledges of blockholders are met
with a resoundingly negative market reaction of about -4.6% (significant at p < 0.01 level),
which corresponds to the destruction of about $20 million ($405 million) in shareholder value for
the median (mean) firm in my sample. These losses are more severe when the charitable
blockholder has formal monitoring responsibilities (serving on the board of directors or acting as
the manager of a hedge fund’s stake). In sum, these results suggest that socially responsible
2

I use male pronouns in this paper with apologies to Shelby White, the single female in my sample of 32
philanthropic blockholders.

2

actions by an owner may bring more costs than benefits to the firm in multi-owner settings where
the owners rely on one another’s self-interested preferences for wealth maximization (as is
typical with publically traded, widely held corporations).
Hypothesis Development and Theory
Acting in a socially responsible manner brings many benefits to the firm. For example,
the literatures in management and accounting have drawn links from CSR to improved firm
financial performance (for a review, see Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), reporting quality
(Y. Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012), information environment (Schadewitz & Niskala, 2010), and
employee effort (Porter & Kramer, 2002). The vast majority of this research focuses on costly,
socially responsible decisions that managers make with owner resources. Whether managers
should take such actions is a debated subject (see Jensen, 2001 for an overview of the advantages
of having managers focus on value maximization relative to stakeholder preferences and social
responsibility), but what is not is that CSR occurs in various forms across the market, and its
popularity seems to be growing (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012).
While most archival CSR research focuses on the actions of managers in firms, more
money is donated to charity by individuals. The philanthropic activities of the super wealthy are
particularly newsworthy, and it is not uncommon for the media to note their positions of
corporate authority and ownership when discussing their charity (e.g. Willett, 2012). On an
annual basis, individuals in the US donate to charity about fifteen times the sum of all corporate
gifts. While CSR can take forms other than direct giving, this ratio suggests that the socially
responsible actions of owners and insiders of large corporations are perhaps economically
significant.
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Analytical and experimental results in CSR research can lend some insight as to the effect
of owner social responsibility, as CSR models and experiments rarely distinguish between
owners and managers (generally, these studies examine a simple principal-agent model). For
example, employee altruism that results from the philanthropy of their employer is unlikely to
distinguish between giving initiated by managers and giving initiated by owners (Aguilera,
Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007). Likewise, the increased effort employees contribute to
philanthropic employers is also unlikely to disappear when the owner philanthropy happens at
the shareholder, rather than manager level (Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, & Williamson, 2011).
Additionally, the ability to use CSR to build a goodwill reserve as a form of insurance in the case
of poor financial performance (Peloza, 2006) or disaster of an industrial or environmental nature
(Porter & Kramer, 2006) should extend, to a degree, to the owners as well as managers. The
reputational insurance discussed in Peloza (2006) may be especially important to wealthy
owners, as their reputation affects their ability to influence managers, institutions, and potential
target firms.
This set of literature, generally based in psychology theory (e.g. altruism, gift-exchange),
supposes that social responsibility on behalf of the principal is generally associated with benefits
to the firm. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) confirm this in a recent experimental study and find that,
with fixed wages, agents contribute more effort to philanthropic principals than greedy
principals. I move this theory into the multi-owner setting common among publically traded
firms in the US and use it to form an expectation as to the market reaction to the charitable
pledges of blockholders.
I identify this hypothesis, speculating a positive market reaction to the philanthropic
pledge of a blockholder, as H1P, my first hypothesis with a basis in psychology theory.

4

H1P: A firm will experience a positive market reaction to the news that a
blockholder has made a major charitable pledge.
H1P is strongly supported by experimental research that makes use of a simple principal
agent model (Balakrishnan et al., 2011). Moving from the principal-agent model into a world
where owners and managers are separate, however, introduces agency costs (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Applying our existing understanding of CSR to the realm of blockholder charity
necessitates examining whether or not agency problems involving blockholders exist that would
undermine the validity of prior results that rely on simpler ownership models.
The results of Shleifer & Vishny (1986) and Edmans (2009), among others, suggest that
such an agency problem may exist. This blockholder literature on agency theory suggests that
blockholders play an important role in monitoring management, and that small shareholders free
ride on this monitoring. Blockholders act as reliable monitors of the firm (and managers in
particular) for their own self-interest, as expending resources to monitor managers is wealthmaximizing to a point. The costs of monitoring managers are generally fixed, and blockholders
hold the residual rights to enough of the firm to recoup the fixed costs of monitoring while
dispersed shareholders tend not to.
If a blockholder were to signal that his self-interest was weakening, or was lower than
expected, small shareholders may take this as bad news. Small shareholders rely on the selfinterest of blockholders to monitor the firm and its managers, and weaker preferences for selfinterest on the part of the blockholder could mean weaker incentives for the blockholder to
monitor managers. The results of Edmans (2009) suggest that self-interested monitoring by
blockholders encourages managers to focus on long term firm profits and discourages managerial
myopia. These results hold for small blocks of stock (greater than 5% but less than the threshold
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for control), as even these small blockholders are generally well informed, and threaten to sell
the stock if the (closely monitored) managers disappoint. Edmans (2009) labels this increased
investment efficiency of managers monitored by self-interested blockholders a social benefit, as
it increases the value of smaller, dispersed shareholdings as well.
I use this stream of literature to motivate my first hypothesis based in agency theory
(H1A), that the selfless charitable pledge of a blockholder reduces firm value. Note that this
agency theory hypothesis, H1A, offers the opposite prediction of my first hypothesis based in
psychology theory, H1P.
H1A: A firm will experience a negative market reaction to the news that a
blockholder has made a major charitable pledge.
As discussed in motivating my first set of hypotheses on blockholder philanthropy,
behavior observed (Balakrishnan et al., 2011) in simple principal agent environments may
conflict with the reality of incentives in more realistic situations with multiple owners who are
generally separate from management (Edmans, 2009). However, while altruism motivates
agents to contribute more to philanthropic principals, experimental research suggests that agent
contributions to the principal increase when the principal has more authority to be generous not
only to philanthropic causes, but also to the agent (Cox, 2004). Balakrishnan et al., (2011)
confirm this result, and find that the ability of the charitable principal to reciprocate agent
contributions increases these agent contributions. This line of research generally concludes that
agents believe principals more generous with charity will in turn be more generous to them
(Godfrey, 2005).
While the possibility of reciprocity may not serve to influence employee effort in the case
of outside blockholder charity, it could serve to motivate employees to contribute more to the
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firm when the philanthropic blockholder has some input on employee compensation. The data
on blockholder charitable pledges I use includes the pledges of some directors. The philanthropy
of these director blockholders may induce higher contributions of effort among employees, as
prior research suggests these employees expect such generosity to flow to them as well. Director
charity may have the greatest impact in increasing the effort level of upper level managers (like
CEOs), as directors play an explicit role in setting the compensation contracts for these
employees.
This stream of literature goes further than that motivating H1P, which states that
philanthropic principals elicit higher levels of effort from their agents. Specifically, the results of
Cox (2004) and Balakrishnan et al. ( 2011) suggest that effort is increased to a greater degree
when the principal has the ability to reciprocate the agents’ contributions, as would be the case
when the principal serves on the board of directors. I test this hypothesis, the second stemming
from psychology theory, as H2P.
H2P: The charitable pledges of director blockholders will elicit a higher market
reaction than the charitable pledges of blockholders who do not serve on the
board.
This research based on laboratory experiments suggests that the ability of philanthropic
principals to reciprocate agent effort will lead to higher levels of effort and increased firm value.
Again, it is important to identify agency problems that could complicate this relation when
moving from the lab to the ownership structures observed in publically traded US firms. While
directors do have the authority to set compensation contracts for senior managers, they also bear
the fiduciary responsibility to monitor managers on behalf of the shareholders.
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In general, research has shown that blockholding directors effectively respond to their
economic and fiduciary duties when it comes to monitoring management on shareholders’
behalf. Beasley (1996) finds that blockholding directors lower firm fraud risk. Gul & Tsui
(2001) find that the audit risk of firms with blockholding directors is lower, and that
blockholding directors are effective at preventing managers from taking advantage of firms with
high levels of free cash flow. Bhagat, Carey, & Elson (1998) examine firm performance and
observe that not only do firms with blockholding directors see higher returns, but that they are
more likely to replace failing CEOs.
This literature consistently shows that shareholders rely on blockholding directors, even
more so than outside blockholders, to serve as strong monitors. When these blockholding
directors signal a weakening of their self-interested incentives to maximize their wealth, those
who rely on these incentives to protect their own wealth (dispersed shareholders) may interpret
this signal negatively. I use this agency problem to motivate my second hypothesis grounded in
agency theory, H2A. Note that his hypothesis predicts the opposite of my second hypothesis
based on psychology theories, H2P.
H2A: The charitable pledges of director blockholders will elicit a lower market
reaction than the charitable pledges of blockholders who do not serve on the
board.
Another class of charitable investor that appears frequently in my data is hedge fund
3

managers. While these managers do not personally own large blocks of stock, they exercise
control over blocks through their position as a fund manager, and they face economic incentives
similar to owners. Philanthropy by hedge fund managers likely endows their hedge fund with a
3

I use the terms hedge fund, institutional investor, and institution interchangeably throughout this manuscript (also,
hedge fund manager and institutional investor principal). Most of the institutional investors in my sample are hedge
funds or private investment partnerships (that operate similarly to hedge funds).
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socially responsible reputation. Research into socially responsible institutional investors
suggests that such a reputation may be valuable. Graves & Waddock (1994), for example,
suggest that investors are attracted to socially responsible funds and are willing to pay a premium
for them (Shank, Manullang, & Hill, 2005 find support for this conjecture). The results of
Mackey, Mackey, & Barney (2007) and Pava & Krausz (1996) suggest that this is driven by a
subset of investors who are willing to pay a very high premium for socially responsible funds.
Beyond those investors willing to provide capital to socially responsible institutional
investors at below market rates, a budding stream of literature has begun to investigate the role
of social responsibility in opening up investment opportunities for institutions, as institutional
CSR benefits the image of large investors (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010). Petersen & Vredenburg
(2009) survey institutional investor principals to determine the benefits of this image
enhancement. Beyond increasing their access to resources, the survey results illustrate that an
improved image of the investing institution reduces problems with the government and
surrounding communities, as well as softens public perception and reduces hostile media
attention.
This stream of research suggests a reputation for being socially responsible allows an
institutional investor preferential access to resources, less government oversight, and the ability
to attract investors willing to provide capital at discounted rates. When hedge fund managers
join The Giving Pledge, their fund likely reaps these benefits from being recognized as socially
responsible. I test this supposition in H3P, my third hypothesis based on psychology theory
(altruism, reputational capital).
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H3P: The charitable pledges of the principals of institutional blockholders (hedge
fund managers) will elicit a higher market reaction than the charitable pledges of
blockholders who are unaffiliated with an institution.
While psychology based research suggests that the philanthropic activity of hedge fund
managers may accrue benefits to the firm (generates altruism which leads to less oversight, better
access to resources, etc.), agency problems may complicate the relation. Similar to directors,
fund managers have not only economic incentives, but a fiduciary duty (to the shareholders of
their fund) to monitor their fund’s holdings.
I focus on the hedge fund monitoring literature to motivate my final hypothesis. This
research generally finds that hedge funds that actively intervene (a form of monitoring) with
managers create value for their shareholders. Clifford (2008) and Kahan & Rock (2007) are
recent additions to this stream of literature that note the particularly strong monitoring role that
hedge funds play.
Hedge fund managers are heavily incentivized to actively monitor firms the fund owns,
and research in hedge fund manager compensation suggests that fund performance is sensitive to
fund manager incentives (see Edwards & Caglayan, 2001 and Agarwal, Daniel, & Naik, 2009).
If the self-interested, wealth maximizing preferences of hedge fund managers weaken, as
signaled by personal charitable pledges, then these managers may be less incentivized (by the
prospect of profit sharing contracts) to pursue effort intensive monitoring activities as
aggressively as shareholders previously expected. If this is the case, and charitable pledges by
hedge fund managers do signal that their incentives to monitor the managers of their fund’s
holdings for a share of fund profits is weaker than expected, then such philanthropy creates an
agency problem.
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I investigate this agency problem in H3A, my third hypothesis motivated by agency
theory.
H3A: The charitable pledges of the principals of institutional blockholders (hedge
fund managers) will elicit a lower market reaction than the charitable pledges of
blockholders who are unaffiliated with an institution.
My hypotheses predict the anticipated market reactions to the philanthropic pledges of
blockholders. My three hypotheses based in psychology theory anticipate positive market
reactions to the announcement of blockholder charity. Behavioral preferences for philanthropy
on the part of investors, customers, and employees should serve to increase the market value of
firms whose major owners are charitable (H1P). This effect should be larger when these owners
have the ability to reciprocate increased agent contributions to the firm (in the role of directors,
H2P) and when the charity lowers the cost of capital and government oversight of investors (as in
the case of hedge fund managers, H3P). I motivate an opposing set of hypotheses using agency
theory. These hypotheses are based on the theory that small shareholders rely on the self-interest
of blockholders to monitor managers, and that blockholder philanthropy signals a weakening of
the wealth-maximizing preferences of blockholders on which smaller shareholders rely (H1A).
Given the stronger monitoring roles that directors (H2A) and hedge fund managers (H3A) play,
agency theory suggests that philanthropy on their part is particularly harmful for small
shareholders (and as a result, destroys firm value).
Data and Empirics
To determine the effects of shareholder philanthropy on firm value, I examine the
abnormal returns to a firm upon the announcement of a major charitable pledge by a large
shareholder. I use the signatories of The Giving Pledge as my sample of charitable major
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shareholders. The Giving Pledge is a charity drive, initiated by Warren Buffett and Bill Gates,
that aims to secure pledges from wealthy individuals (median net worth in my sample is $2.2
billion) to donate to charity at least half of their wealth during their lifetime or upon their death.
By examining the market reaction to the pledge announcement, this method abstracts from issues
involving the specific charity these shareholders choose to donate to, the amount donated, and
the source of the funds to be donated (as none of this information is released at the
announcement of the pledge, or even decided upon at that time).
Besides Gates and Buffett, notable signatories (not all appear in my sample) include
Larry Ellison (Oracle co-founder), Paul Allen (Microsoft co-founder), Arthur Blank (Home
Depot co-founder), Michael Bloomberg (Bloomberg L.P. founder and mayor of New York City),
Barron Hilton (hotel magnate), Carl Icahn (activist investor), George Lucas (film producer), Elon
Musk (co-founder of Paypal and Tesla Motors, founder of SpaceX), Ted Turner (media mogul),
and Mark Zuckerberg (co-founder and CEO of Facebook). See Table 1 for a list of the
signatories in my sample.
My original sample includes all the philanthropists that signed The Giving Pledge from
its inception in 2010 through the end of 2011. I identify 32 of these signatories as major owners
of U.S. corporations through SEC filings (firms are required to disclose owners of blocks greater
than 5%). These SEC filings are updated at least once a year, and I code signatories as major
owners if they are included in a company’s filing in the 365 days prior to their signing The
Giving Pledge. The 32 signatories I identify hold major stakes in 122 firms for a total of 124
observations (some firms have multiple major owners sign the pledge). Table 1 includes a
column reporting the number of holdings for each of the signatories in my sample.
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One of the 32 signatories in my sample is James Simons, recently retired founder, CEO,
and manager of Renaissance Technologies, a $15 billion hedge fund. 44 of my 124 observations
are Renaissance Technologies holdings, making James Simons a very influential observation in
my sample. As such, I report all of my results in two panels, one including the 44 observations
attributable to James Simons (for a total of 124 observations), and one excluding the 44
observations attributable to James Simons (for a total of 80 observations). My results are
generally robust to his exclusion.
To test H1P against H1A, I run event studies on the announcement dates on which the
major shareholders announce their signing of The Giving Pledge. I use the value weighted index
as a benchmark, and I rely on the market model to discern abnormal returns. I determine
statistical significance of these mean (median) abnormal returns using the standardized crosssectional z score of Boehmer, Masumeci, & Poulsen (1991) (Cowan, 1992).
While I tabulate abnormal returns for a variety of windows, I focus on the (-30, -1) runup period in my analysis. The super wealthy shareholders making the charitable pledges in my
sample likely do so only after consulting with their lawyers, estate planners, investment
managers, and accountants. Similar to merger and acquisition announcements, I expect such
consultations to result in information leakage, such that (at least part of) the news is already
incorporated into market prices when it is publically announced (both Cumming & Li (2011) and
Gao & Oler (2012) discuss this run-up period return).
I test H2P against H2A and H3P against H3A using regressions on the abnormal returns
generated by the event studies. I pit H2P against H2A to determine whether director shareholder
charity leads to a higher or lower market reaction. I am able to determine through the SEC
filings if the charitable shareholder is a director. About 25% of the firm-events in my sample
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come from firms in which the major charitable shareholder is also a director (about 39% of the
remainder if I remove the 44 firm-events attributable to James Simons).
I test H3P against H3A to learn whether the abnormal returns around the charitable
pledges of hedge fund managers differ from those of individual shareholders. I determine
whether the charitable owner owns his shares individually or controls them through a hedge fund
while gathering individual holdings data from SEC filings. About half of the firm-events in my
sample come from firms in which the major charitable shareholder controls his holding through
an institution (about 30% of the remainder if I remove the 44 firm-events attributable to James
Simons).
Beyond the variables of interest for my hypotheses, I include a number of controls in the
cross sectional regressions. Owner age may affect the market reaction if investors are concerned
with the owner, his estate, or charity recipient selling off a large block of shares in the near future
(soon before or upon their death, see Slovin & Sushka, 1993). Controlling for signatory age
alleviates the concerns that the abnormal returns I observe are driven by liquidity or blockholder
exit concerns.
I also control for prior charitable shareholder giving, as market expectations may differ in
cases in which the charitable shareholder has a history of being socially responsible. I control
for these instances by including an indicator variable for whether or not the shareholder is
4

affiliated with a private foundation. This data comes directly from The Giving Pledge, as
signatories report their prior association with charitable foundations.
Additionally, I control for both charitable shareholder total net worth (natural log) and the
percentage of net worth the charitable shareholder has tied up in the firm. The market reaction to
4

The Gates Foundation is a popular example and has received considerable gifts from both Bill Gates and Warren
Buffett in the past.
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the charitable pledge of higher net worth blockholders may be less severe, as they have less
expected marginal utility of wealth to begin with. Likewise, the market reaction to an
overinvested, undiversified major shareholder signing The Giving Pledge may reflect the
strategic contributions expected of the undiversified shareholder in an attempt to protect their
wealth. I draw net worth figures from The Giving Pledge, as participants report it at the signing
5

announcement. I compare participants’ net worth to the value of their major holding(s) using
stock price data from the CRSP database.
Furthermore, I control for whether the charitable shareholder controls the firm, defined as
6

owning more than 20% of the shares (as in Villalonga & Amit, 2006).

In these cases,

incentive alignment problems are already apparent (see Zingales, 1995; Nenova, 2003; and
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and minority shareholders may actually welcome socially responsible
actions by the controlling shareholder, as weaker preferences for self-interest may lead the
controlling shareholder to lessen their expropriation of private benefits of control.
Finally, I include a small set of firm level controls to proxy for the value of outside
monitoring. External monitoring generally benefits diversified firms more than specialized
firms, as diversification can create agency costs as the firm attempts to allocate resources
between divisions (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997 and Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). Similar
agency problems affect firms with foreign operations (Burgman, 1996). Given these issues, I
include indicator variables in my regressions to proxy for firms that operate in multiple industries
and countries. I also control for firm leverage, as debt has been shown to create both agency
costs (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; W. S. Kim & Sorensen, 1986; and Mello & Parsons, 1992)
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Edward Rose III did not report his net worth at the time of his signing. I estimate this figure by compounding his
latest reported net worth by the market rate of return to his signing date.
6
Using their percentage of ownership as a continuous measure yields similar results.
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and benefits (e.g. Jensen, 1986 and Korteweg, 2010) that could correlate with the value of
outside monitoring. I also control for firm size, as evidence suggests outside monitoring is more
beneficial in reducing agency costs to large firms (e.g. Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004
and Singh & Davidson III, 2003).
I run cross sectional OLS regressions, including the above control variables, to test H2P
against H2A and H3P against H3A. These regressions use the (-30, -1) day run-up announcement
abnormal return as the dependent variable, but using other run-up windows (including and
excluding the actual announcement date) yields similar results. Regression standard errors are
7

robust and clustered in two dimensions by year and signatory. Given my small sample size, I
also include in my regression tables an F-statistic for each of my models. F-statistics
corresponding to regressions significant at the p=0.05 level or better are in bold.
Results
Table 1 lists the names and details of the charitable shareholders included in my study.
Many of these names are recognizable, and the typical signatory can be thought of as a very
successful entrepreneur (usually in the technology or energy sectors) in his late sixties or early
seventies with a net worth of around $2.2 billion.
Table 2 reports the abnormal returns to firms that these signatories hold large stakes in at
(and prior to) the announcement that they have signed The Giving Pledge. While the actual (-1,
+1) announcement period abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero, the strongly
negative run-up period abnormal returns suggests that news of the impending signing leaks and
8

is viewed poorly by investors. Panel A of Table 2 reports the mean (median) abnormal return in
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Clustering standard errors by announcement date leads to similar results.
In untabulated robustness tests I find that the run-up period abnormal returns do not reverse in the weeks after the
announcement.
8
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the (-30, -1) day run-up window to be -4.6% (-4.39%), significant at the p< 0.01 level (Z = -2.9).
This suggests that the median firm in my sample (market value = $430 million) sees $20 million
in shareholder value destroyed in the run-up to the announcement that a major shareholder has
signed The Giving Pledge. For the mean firm in my sample (market value = $8.8 billion), the
corresponding destruction in shareholder value is around $405 million.
Panel B of Table 2 excludes the 44 observations attributable to hedge fund principal
James Simons. These results are directionally consistent with the results of the full sample, but
have slightly weaker statistical support. In general, I take this as evidence that the third of my
observations attributable to James Simons are not driving the directional results of my study, and
that beyond James Simons, major shareholder philanthropy destroys firm value.
These event study findings indicate that in widely held, publically traded companies,
9

shareholder philanthropy destroys firm value. This settles the question between H1A
(supported) and H1P (rejected), and suggests that costs of some sort overwhelm the benefits of
principal philanthropy. Agency problems are a potential source of such costs, as the
experimental results underlying the majority of my psychology based hypotheses abstract from
such considerations. I test H2A and H3A (my agency theory hypotheses) against H2P and H3P
(my hypotheses based in behavioral psychology), respectively, to investigate this possibility.
Table 3 describes the variables in the cross-sectional regressions used to test H2P against
H2A and H3P against H3A. In the broad sample (Table 3; Panel A) of 124 firms, it appears that
the charitable shareholder is a director in 25% of the cases, a hedge fund manager in about half
of the cases (only 30% in Panel B, where James Simons is excluded), the controlling shareholder
in 23% of the cases, and generally has 9% of his net worth invested in the firm.
9

This finding is contrary to Balakrishnan et al (2011), but in a setting that incorporates the agency problems of
dispersed ownership and the separation of ownership and management. I consider my results a boundary condition
to Balakrishnan et al (2011).
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Table 4 reports the cross-sectional regressions, incorporating the controls from Table 3,
to test H2P against H2A and H3P against H3A. The dependent variable in all of these models is
the (-30, -1) day announcement run-up abnormal return. Models 1 and 3 regress this abnormal
return on the variables of interest for H2P/H2A (Director) and H3P/H3A (Institutional Shareholder
Principal), respectively. Models 2 (Director) and 4 (Institutional Shareholder Principal) add
control variables to Models 1(Director) and 3 (Institutional Shareholder Principal). Model 5
includes both indicator variables of interest, Director and Institutional Shareholder Principal, as
well as the control variables. Panel A includes the entire sample, and Panel B excludes the 44
observations attributable to James Simons. I include the predictions of my various hypotheses
on the Director and Institutional Shareholder Principal indicator variables in an abbreviated
column on the far right.
I first examine the Director indicator variable to test between H2P and H2A. I find strong
evidence to suggest that agency problems are driving the negative abnormal returns to the
announcement of shareholder philanthropy. While the regressions including the director
indicator alone (Table 4; Panels A and B; Model 1) do not offer any predictive power
(insignificant regressions based on the F-Statistic), it registers as negative and significant in both
models that include control variables (Models 2 and 5). In Model 5, with the other control
variables set at the median (mean), the run-up abnormal return to the announcement of a major
outside shareholder’s pledge is -8.6% (-2.6%). For a shareholder serving on the board of
directors, the analogous announcement run-up return is -17.2% (-11.2%). For the median firm,
these percentages (median values) correspond to the philanthropic pledge of a major outside
shareholder destroying $37 million in shareholder value and that of a director destroying $74
million in shareholder value. The mean firm in my sample is larger than the median by a factor
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of about 20. As such, the economic significance of these results for the mean firm are larger by
an order of magnitude.
I next examine the Institutional Shareholder Principal indicator variable to test between
H3P and H3A. In Models 3 and 5 of Table 4, Panel A, the Institutional Shareholder Principal
indicator variable is significantly negative. This would suggest that, including the effects of
other control variables, philanthropic pledges by institutional shareholder principals are
particularly damaging to firms in which their institution holds a stake greater than 5%. If we
exclude the effects of James Simons (Panel B of Table 4), the institutional investor principal
responsible for one third of my sample, these results hold in direction, if not always significance.
Model 5 is the only model in Panel B of Table 4 that is both statistically significant and includes
the Institutional Shareholder Principal indicator variable. This variable appears with a strong
negative coefficient which offers further support for H3A. Specifically, this alleviates any
concern that James Simons is driving my findings on institutional investor principals.
I evaluate Model 5 of Panel A (Table 4) for economic significance. With the other
control variables set at the median (mean), firms see negative abnormal returns of -5.2% (-2.9%)
in the run-up to the announcement that a noninstitutional blockholder has joined The Giving
Pledge. For firms whose charitable blockholders are institutional investor principals (hedge fund
managers), the corresponding negative abnormal run-up is -8.6% (-6.3%). These differences are
statistically significant. For the median firm, this amounts to $22 million in shareholder value
destroyed when a noninstitutional blockholder joins The Giving Pledge and $37 million in
shareholder value destroyed when an Institutional Shareholder Principal joins The Giving
Pledge. Again, the analogous losses for the mean firm in my sample are larger by at least an
order of magnitude.
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Conclusion
Experimental research into principal philanthropy finds that such charity is generally an
NPV positive project for the firm, as principal gifts are recouped through the agent’s increased
effort (Balakrishnan et al., 2011). Other work in CSR supports this view, as charity affiliated
with a specific company has also been linked to employee altruism (Aguilera et al., 2007),
insurance against disaster (Peloza, 2006 and Porter & Kramer, 2006), and good outcomes in
general (Beurden & Gössling, 2008). I test this hypothesis using a natural experiment, a
collection of 32 major shareholders of 122 publically traded firms making comparable charitable
pledges, and find that agency costs crowd out any benefits of principal philanthropy in my
sample. While I examine only participation in The Giving Pledge, these results likely extend to
more commonplace displays of owner, director, and fund manager philanthropy, at least in
settings where they are expected to play a monitoring role.
Prior literature on agency theory suggests that small shareholders rely on the self-interest
of large shareholders to monitor the firm and its managers (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988 and
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). When these large shareholders make a charitable pledge, it sends a
signal that they are not as self-interested as previously thought. For investors, this weakening of
monitoring incentives appears to outweigh the benefits of CSR, and such announcements destroy
about $20 million in shareholder value for the median firm (4.6% of firm value). This negative
reaction is more pronounced when the charitable blockholder has been tasked with fiduciary
monitoring responsibilities, specifically in the role of director or manager of a hedge fund’s
stake.
In particular, these results imply that directors and fund managers who control major
stakes are failing in their fiduciary duties to their electing shareholders (the owners of the firm or

20

fund that elected/hired them) when they pledge their own funds to charity. Unless these
fiduciary agents are able to bind themselves to remaining vigilant monitors, the only clearly
evident solution to this issue is for directors and fund managers controlling major blocks to step
down from their positions before embarking on major personal campaigns of philanthropy. To
remain in their positions calls into question their incentives to monitor the firm, which creates an
agency problem that destroys shareholder value of the very firm they bear a fiduciary
responsibility to protect.
This agency cost of shareholder philanthropy also complicates the suggestion that
managers should reduce firm-driven CSR to allow more wealth to flow to the shareholders for
their own charitable (and other) ends. The results of this paper clearly suggest that shareholder
charity has its own costs, which should be considered in future analyses of the alternatives to
corporate giving.
Beyond the contributions of this paper to the literatures in corporate social responsibility
and agency theory, I encourage other archival researchers to look to experimental work for
inspiration. Experimental research in business and economics offers a multitude of predictions
based on human behavior. Investigating how behavior changes when it emerges from the lab
and encounters the frictions of reality, like agency costs, can further our understanding of real
world incentives, both economic and psychological.
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Table 1
Table 1 reports the names, number of major holdings, date of pledge, age at time of pledge, and
net worth (in billions $USD) of the 32 major shareholders in my sample.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Major Holdings
(Greater than 5%) at
Name
time of signing The
Giving Pledge
Nicolas Berggruen
1
Warren Buffett
10
Steve Case
1
Lee Cooperman
4
John Doerr
2
Larry Ellison
3
Phillip Frost
6
Bill Gates
12
Harold Hamm
1
Jon Huntsman
1
Carl Icahn
3
Irwin Jacobs
1
George B. Kaiser
4
Vinod Khosla
1
Sidney Kimmel
1
Ken Langone
1
Alfred E. Mann
1
Joe Mansueto
1
Michael Milken
2
George P. Mitchell
1
Pierre Omidyar
1
Ronald O. Perelman
4
T. Boone Pickens
1
Julian H. Robertson, Jr.
1
Edward W. Rose
1
David M. Rubenstein
3
Henry Samueli
1
Walter Scott, Jr.
1
Harold Simmons
5
James Simons
44
Tom Steyer
4
Shelby White
1
124

Date signed
The Giving
Pledge
8/25/2010
8/4/2010
12/9/2010
9/27/2010
8/4/2010
8/3/2010
4/28/2011
6/6/2010
4/19/2011
6/18/2010
9/21/2010
8/1/2010
7/26/2010
4/28/2011
11/18/2010
7/14/2010
8/4/2010
12/8/2010
12/8/2010
12/8/2010
8/4/2010
8/4/2010
8/4/2010
8/4/2010
4/28/2011
8/4/2010
12/1/2011
6/24/2010
3/10/2011
7/11/2010
6/29/2010
8/1/2010

Age at Pledge
49
80
52
67
59
66
76
55
66
73
74
77
67
56
81
75
84
54
64
91
42
67
82
78
70
61
57
79
80
72
53
71

Net Worth
($ Billion)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2.3
46.0
1.7
2.2
2.5
41.0
2.4
66.0
9.7
0.9
14.8
1.5
10.0
1.4
1.2
1.6
1.0
1.7
2.3
2.0
8.2
12.0
1.2
2.6
0.3
1.9
1.8
2.1
7.1
11.0
1.3
1.0
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Table 2: Abnormal Returns
Table 2 reports the results of the event studies examining the run-up and event returns of the
announcement that a major shareholder ( >5%) has signed The Giving Pledge. These results test
between H1P against H1A.
Table 2, Panel A
Panel A reports the results of the event study using the value weighted index. This panel
includes the 44 observations attributable to hedge fund manager James Simons. I measure the
statistical significance of mean (median) abnormal returns with the Standardized Cross-Sectional
Z Score (Generalized Sign Z Score).
Window

Firm Events

(-45,-1)
(-30,-1)
(-15, -1)
(-1,+1)

124
124
124
124

Mean Abnormal
Return
-6.29%
-4.58%
-3.27%
0.07%

Mean Abnormal
Return Z Score
-2.64***
-2.90***
-3.26***
0.03

Median Abnormal Median Abnormal
Return
Return Z Score
-5.05%
-1.63
-4.39%
-2.72***
-2.96%
-2.72***
-0.19%
0.01

Predicted Sign
H1A(-) H1P(+)
H1A(-) H1P(+)
H1A(-) H1P(+)
H1A(-) H1P(+)

Table 2, Panel B
Panel B reports the results of the event study using the value weighted index. This panel does
not include the 44 observations attributable to hedge fund manager James Simons. I measure the
statistical significance of mean (median) abnormal returns with the Standardized Cross-Sectional
Z Score (Generalized Sign Z Score).
Window

Firm Events

(-45,-1)
(-30,-1)
(-15, -1)
(-1,+1)

80
80
80
80

Mean Abnormal
Return
-2.73%
-2.56%
-3.05%
-0.51%

Mean Abnormal
Return Z Score
-0.86
-1.46
-3.11**
-0.88

Median Abnormal Median Abnormal
Return
Return Z Score
-1.45%
-0.05
-1.70%
-1.13
-2.55%
-2.22**
-0.35%
-0.48

Predicted Sign
H1A(-) H1P(+)
H1A(-) H1P(+)
H1A(-) H1P(+)
H1A(-) H1P(+)
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the variables that appear in the cross sectional
regressions. These include the variables of interest for H2P/H2A (Director) and H3P/H3A
(Institutional Shareholder Principal), as well as a host of control variables.
Table 3; Panel A
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the regression variables, including the 44 observations
attributable to James Simons.
Variable
Director (Dummy)
Institutional Shareholder Principal (Dummy)
Net Worth (in billions, USD)
Percent of Wealth Invested
Controlling Shareholder (Dummy)
Prior Charitable Foundation (Dummy)
Charitable Shareholder Age
Multiple Segments (Dummy)
Foreign Income (Dummy)
Leverage
Market Capitalization (USD)

Firm
Events
124
124
124
124
124
124
124
124
124
124
124

Mean

Std. Dev

0.25
0.54
17.04
9%
0.23
0.91
69.24
0.45
0.51
0.18
$8.8 Bil.

0.43
0.5
20.16
20%
0.43
0.29
8.91
0.5
0.5
0.16
$28 Bil.

1st
Median
Quartile
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.25
2.4
11
< 1%
< 1%
1%
0
0
0
0
1
1
42
66
72
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0.08
0.15
$3.2 Mil. $110 Mil. $430 Mil.
Min.

3rd
Quartile
0.5
1
12
4%
0
1
74
1
1
0.25
$2 Bil.

Max.
1
1
66
89%
1
1
91
1
1
0.75
$200 Bil.

Table 3; Panel B
Panel B reports the summary statistics of the regression variables, not including the 44
observations attributable to James Simons.
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Table 4: Cross Sectional Regressions
Table 4 reports the results of the cross sectional regressions used to test H2P against H2A
(Director) and H3P against H3A (Institutional Shareholder Principal). The dependent variable in
these regressions is the (-30, -2) day run-up period prior to the announcement that a major
shareholder has signed the giving pledge. Standard Errors are robust and clustered by year and
individual director, of which there are 32 in my sample. T-statistics are reported in brackets
beneath the coefficients. Coefficient statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. The number of observations, R2, and F-Statistic are
reported for each model. Statistical significance of the models is denoted by F-Statistics in bold.
Table 4; Panel A
Panel A reports the results of the cross sectional regressions on the announcement run-up
abnormal returns identified with the value weighted index. This panel includes the 44
observations attributable to James Simons.

Director
Institutional Shareholder Principal
Ln(Net Worth)
Percent of Wealth Invested
Controlling Shareholder (Dummy)
Prior Charitable Foundation (Dummy)
Ln(Charitable Shareholder Age)
Multiple Segments (Dummy)
Foreign Income (Dummy)
Leverage
Size
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic

DV: Charitable Pledge Announcement Run-up CAR (-30, -1); Value Weighted Index
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Predicted Sign
0.0055
-0.0720***
-0.0860***
H2A(-) H2P(+)
[0.7609]
[-4.4567]
[-3.7297]
-0.0514***
-0.0109
-0.0345***
H3A(-) H3P(+)
[-7.7481]
[-0.6930]
[-11.7747]
0.0223***
0.0278***
0.0211***
[6.4884]
[7.5316]
[4.3843]
0.0757**
0.0603*
0.0649*
[2.1154]
[1.8141]
[1.9531]
0.0657***
0.0321***
0.0545***
[8.6485]
[4.5584]
[4.0529]
-0.1002***
-0.0931*
-0.0969**
[-3.1875]
[-2.0121]
[-2.5833]
0.0446
0.0685
0.0669
[0.4887]
[0.6455]
[0.8104]
0.0284***
0.0176
0.0281***
[2.8099]
[1.6564]
[3.1581]
-0.0236*
-0.0235***
-0.019
[-1.8123]
[-4.3037]
[-1.4393]
0.0132*
0.0071
0.0253**
[1.9556]
[0.6788]
[2.4381]
0.0124***
0.0076***
0.0120***
[5.5052]
[4.0474]
[3.8990]
-0.0491***
-0.4506
-0.0199***
-0.4705
-0.5145
[-16.0397]
[-1.1904]
[-28.4057]
[-1.0261]
[-1.5426]
124
0.04%
0.04

124
21.17%
5.46

124
4.09%
4.64

124
18.05%
6.33

124
22.14%
9.29
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Table 4: Cross Sectional Regressions (cont.)
Table 4; Panel B
Panel B reports the results of the cross sectional regressions on the announcement run-up
abnormal returns identified with the value weighted index. This panel does not include the 44
observations attributable to James Simons.

Director
Institutional Shareholder Principal
Ln(Net Worth)
Percent of Wealth Invested
Controlling Shareholder (Dummy)
Prior Charitable Foundation (Dummy)
Ln(Charitable Shareholder Age)
Multiple Segments (Dummy)
Foreign Income (Dummy)
Leverage
Size
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic

DV: Charitable Pledge Announcement Run-up CAR (-30, -1); Value Weighted Index
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Predicted Sign
-0.0259***
-0.0661***
-0.0769***
H2A(-) H2P(+)
[-26.9171]
[-3.3641]
[-3.0758]
-0.0271
0.0023
-0.0260***
H3A(-) H3P(+)
[-1.1858]
[0.2101]
[-45.0020]
0.0283***
0.0339***
0.0258***
[5.5428]
[7.3649]
[4.3688]
0.1234***
0.1211***
0.1040***
[5.1527]
[4.6922]
[5.0993]
0.0434**
0.017
0.0429**
[2.6757]
[1.3704]
[2.3343]
-0.0977***
-0.0926*
-0.0978**
[-2.8267]
[-2.0213]
[-2.5514]
0.0966
0.1133
0.092
[0.9147]
[0.9563]
[0.9432]
0.0303*
0.0182
0.0299*
[1.9279]
[1.0592]
[1.9311]
-0.0175
-0.0201
-0.0132
[-0.7593]
[-1.6879]
[-0.5257]
0.0365***
0.0284
0.0361***
[7.1457]
[1.3173]
[3.4389]
0.0031
-0.0018
0.005
[0.7696]
[-0.5702]
[1.1517]
-0.0176***
-0.4915
-0.0199***
-0.4827
-0.4943
[-5.4900]
[-1.2064]
[-28.3407]
[-0.9924]
[-1.3238]
80
1.04%
0.86

80
25.21%
4.20

80
0.98%
0.42

80
20.97%
3.57

80
25.84%
4.46
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